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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Anthony Matney appeals from the judgment summarily dismissing his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In a prior (2014) criminal case, Mr. Matney was charged felony DUI and a persistent
violator enhancement. (See R., pp.32-33, 34-36, 37-38.) He pled guilty to both charges without
the benefit of any sort of plea agreement. (See R., pp.41, 88-89.)
Prior to being sentenced, Mr. Matney filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
(Augmentation, p.1.)1 That motion was made in the form of a pro se letter to the court (see
Augmentation, p.1), which had not been seen by his defense counsel (see R., p.75), David
Smethers.

At the outset of Mr. Matney’s sentencing hearing, Mr. Smethers was given an

opportunity to review Mr. Matney’s pro se motion, and then discuss that motion with
Mr. Matney.

(See R., pp.75-76.)

Although the details of that discussion were obviously

confidential at the time (see R., p.76 (indicating the court took a recess so counsel could speak to
Mr. Matney)), Mr. Matney has since alleged that Mr. Smethers misrepresented the law regarding
the possibility of him withdrawing his guilty pleas (see R., p.8). Specifically, Mr. Matney
alleges that “Mr. Smethers took [him] aside and told him it was too late to withdraw his pleas
and that withdrawal of a ‘Guilty’ plea is absolutely not allowed.” (R., p.8 (emphasis added).)
After Mr. Smethers and Mr. Matney conferred and the court went back on the record,

1

Contemporaneously herewith, Mr. Matney is filing a motion to augment the record on appeal
with a copy of his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. That motion was judicially noticed
by the district court. (See R., p.156 & n.2.)
1

Mr. Smethers promptly withdrew Mr. Matney’s pro se motion. (R., p.76.) The court then
directly addressed Mr. Matney, confirming it was his desire to withdraw the motion. (R., p.76;
see also R., p.77.) Consequently, Mr. Matney’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was never
decided by the district court. (See generally R., pp.75-81.)
The district court then imposed a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with six and onehalf years fixed. (R., pp.47, 80.) Mr. Matney filed a timely Rule 35 motion (R., pp.52, 56-57),
which was denied (R., pp.61-70).

He also filed a timely notice of appeal (R., pp.49-51);

however, the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence as originally imposed, as well as the district
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion, see State v. Matney, No. 43056, 2016 Unpublished
Opinion No. 317 (Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2016). A remittitur was issued on February 1, 2016. (R., p.3.)
On December 16, 2016, Mr. Matney, acting pro se, filed a timely verified Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.2-10.) In his petition, Mr. Matney asserted three illegal sentence
claims, and fifteen claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.3-9.) The only claim
relevant to the present appeal is the following claim of ineffective assistance of counsel:
9. . . .
(k) Appointed Counsel, David J. Smethers, misrepresented the law behind
Matney’s pre-sentencing ability to withdraw his “Guilty” Pleas. After the
November 26th, 2014, District Court Arraignment, after Matney did have time to
consider his serous situation, Matney tried to withdraw his Pleas, Pro se.
Nonetheless, on February 4th, 2014, at Matney’s Sentencing, Mr. Smethers took
Matney aside and told him it was too late to withdraw his Pleas and that
withdrawal of a “Guilty” Peal is absolutely not allowed. This simply isn’t true.
In retrospect it is obvious that Mr. Smether’s [sic] lied to Matney to keep his
secret unwritten “agreement” with the Prosecutor, Ms./Mrs. Anne Voss.
Notwithstanding, Matney’s Pro se attempt to withdraw his Pleas before
Sentencing is perfect evidence that Matney was never a party to the “agreement”
between Mr. Smethers and the State of Idaho. It also clearly demonstrates that
Matney’s Pleas were not Knowingly, Intelligently or Voluntarily made.

2

(R., p.8.)2
After Mr. Matney was appointed counsel (R., pp.23-24), the State filed an answer
(R., pp.28-30).3 Later, it also filed a motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.118-27.) In its
motion, the State argued that Claim 9(k) should be dismissed because Mr. Matney personally
consented to the withdrawal of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. (R., pp.125-26.) The
State apparently reasoned that, so long as a criminal defendant acts based on the mis-advice of
counsel, counsel’s mis-advice cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

(See

R., pp.125-26.) The whole of the State’s argument was as follows:
In the same light as the paragraph above [ineffective assistance of
counsel], Petitioner attacks his ability to withdraw his guilty plea. Contained
within the Sentencing Transcript at pages 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, the issue of
Petitioner withdrawing his guilty plea was brought up. At no time did Petitioner
indicate that he was being forced to withdraw his request to set aside the guilty
plea or take issue with the sentencing going forward. In fact, Petitioner discussed
the matter with the Court and decided to withdraw the request to set aside the
guilty plea. “If you need further clarification and explanation, you can have time
to do that. Defendant: No. Let’s just go ahead and proceed.”
(R., pp.125-26 (quoting the sentencing transcript at p.10, Ls.9-12).)4
After Mr. Matney responded to the State’s motion to dismiss (R., pp.128-34), the State
filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion (R., pp.137-40). In that reply, however, the
State largely failed to address Claim 9(k) (see R., pp.137-40); it simply reiterated the factual
premise underlying its argument: “The sentencing transcript in this matter additionally indicates
that Petitioner made representations before the Court that he did not want to withdraw his guilty
plea” (R., p.139).

2

This claim is referred to herein as “Claim 9(k).”
Attached to the State’s answer were a host of relevant documents from Mr. Matney’s criminal
case. (See R., pp.32-94.)
4
The portion of the sentencing transcript appears at page 77 of the Clerk’s Record.
3

3

The district court held a hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss. (See generally Tr.)
During that hearing, the State proffered the same argument with regard to Claim 9(k) that it had
made in its prior filings:
If it is being considered in the ineffective assistance of counsel argument,
there was the specific inquiry by the trial judge, you know, “Do you want to
withdraw your guilty plea?” And then Mr. Matney indicates, “No. Let’s go
ahead and proceed.”[5]
So the State or respondent in this case is left with trying to utilize a record
where the defendant in the criminal case, or the petitioner, has—has responded to
specific inquiries from the court about pleading, about withdrawing, more
importantly specifically gave consideration about withdrawing that plea, and he
said no. And now we have this allegation that, oh, I couldn’t have—couldn’t
have withdrawn it.[6]
And so I believe that there is ample evidence from this record that
Mr. Matney exercised his independent decision-making at that time to proceed
with the case.
(Tr., p.4, Ls.6-21.)

At the end of the hearing, the court took the State’s motion under

advisement. (Tr., p.10, Ls.19-21.)
Approximately a month after the hearing, the district court entered a written order
granting the State’s motion to dismiss. (R., pp.143-58.) With regard to Claim 9(k), the court
dismissed for a number of reasons, the most prominent of which was that Mr. Matney failed to
prove either prong of the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel, as set forth by
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).7 (R., pp.154-57.) Eventually, the court also
issued a final judgment in the case. (R., p.172.)

5

This is not a verbatim quote of the proceedings. It appears that the prosecutor’s argument
combined portions of pages 7 and 10 of the sentencing hearing transcript. (See R., pp.76-77.)
6
This was a misrepresentation of Mr. Matney’s claim. He did not allege that he could not have
withdrawn his guilty pleas; he alleged that his attorney told him he could not withdraw his guilty
pleas. (R., p.8.)
7
Under Strickland, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must prove: (1) his counsel rendered deficient performance, i.e., that counsel’s
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as judged “under prevailing
4

In the meantime, Mr. Matney had filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s
summary dismissal order.8 (R., pp.163-65.) On appeal, Mr. Matney contends the district court
erred in summarily dismissing Claim 9(k).

professional norms”; and (2) that deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., that there is a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94.
8
Although premature when filed, that notice of appeal became effective upon the district court’s
entry of a final judgment. See I.A.R. 17(e)(2).
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Matney’s Claim 9(k), where the basis for
dismissal was that Mr. Matney had failed to prove his claim?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Matney’s Claim 9(k), Where The Basis
For Dismissal Was That Mr. Matney Had Failed To Prove His Claim
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Matney’s Claim 9(k) based on its conclusion
that he failed to prove that claim. Because he was not required to prove that claim at the
summary disposition stage, the district court erred.

A.

Applicable Legal Standards
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is separate and distinct

from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction. Windom v. State,
162 Idaho 417, 421 (2017). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (“UPCPA”), I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 674 (2010). Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must
ultimately prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Icanovic v. State, 159 Idaho
524, 528 (2015).
Although post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, a petition initiating a postconviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating another civil action. See Ridgley, 148
Idaho at 674-75. A post-conviction petition is required to include more than “a short and plain
statement of the claim,” as is required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) in other cases; it
must “specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based,” and it must be
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits,
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not attached. I.C. § 19-4903.

7

Just as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil
proceedings, the UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c); Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). In analyzing a post-conviction
petition under this standard, the district court need not accept the petitioner’s conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or his conclusions of law. Ridgley, 148 Idaho
at 675. However, if the petitioner presents evidentiary support for his allegations, the court must
take any unrebutted allegations as true. Wheeler v. State, 162 Idaho 357, 359 (2017). This is so
even if the allegations appear incredible on their face. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968).
And even if the State rebuts the petitioner’s allegations, the court must still liberally construe the
facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner. Wheeler, 162 Idaho at 359.
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an evidentiary
hearing to resolve that question. Adamcik v. State, 163 Idaho 114, __, 408 P.3d 474, 482 (2017).
If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal
can be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State’s motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c).
When reviewing a trial court’s decision to summarily dismiss a petition for postconviction relief, this Court will apply the same standard applied by the district court, deciding
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law.
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675; Vavold, 148 Idaho at 45. Because this inquiry never involves the
finding of contested facts, it necessarily involves only determinations of law. Accordingly, an
appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State,
142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).

8

B.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim 9(k)
In dismissing Claim 9(k), the district court reasoned that Mr. Matney had failed to prove

either prong of the Strickland standard.9

However, this was not the proper standard, as

Mr. Matney was not required to prove his claim in order to survive summary dismissal. This
error, as well as others made by the district court, are detailed below.

1.

Deficient Performance

The district court ruled that Claim 9(k) was subject to summary dismissal because,
“Petitioner has not established either prong of the Strickland standard as to this claim.”
(R., p.156.) It then went on to address the first prong of the Strickland analysis—deficient
performance. (R., pp.156-57.) It ruled that Mr. Matney failed to establish deficient performance
for two reasons—because counsel’s recitation of the law “was likely correct,” and because
“Petitioner stated on the record at sentencing that he did not wish to challenge his guilty plea and
that he wanted to proceed with sentencing,” and counsel was justified in relying on that
statement. (R., pp.156-57.) The district court’s ruling was incorrect on multiple levels.
First, the court’s conclusion that counsel’s advice was “likely correct” was based on a
misunderstanding of the evidence. The district court ruled that, “A statement to Petitioner at
sentencing that it was too late to withdraw his guilty plea, though not a full recitation of the law
on withdrawal of pleas, was likely correct there appears to have been no ‘just reason’ for
withdrawing his guilty plea.” (R., p.156.) However, the evidence presented by Mr. Matney

9

Although the section heading for the relevant portion of the district court’s order seemed to
suggest that the court’s ruling only went to the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland standard (see
R., p.154 (“Even if Petitioner’s counsel misstated the law on withdrawal of a guilty plea, such
error was harmless because a motion to withdraw made after issuance of the PSI would likely not
have been granted.”)), the body of its order addressed both the “deficient performance” and
“prejudice” prongs of the standard (see R., pp.156-57).
9

(which was required to be taken as true at the summary dismissal stage, see Wheeler, 162 Idaho
at 359) was not that Mr. Smethers merely told Mr. Matney it was too late to withdraw his guilty
pleas; it was that “Mr. Smethers took Matney aside and told him it was too late to withdraw his
pleas and that withdrawal of a ‘Guilty’ plea is absolutely not allowed.” (R., p.8 (emphasis
added).)

Thus, while the district court characterized the statements of counsel as a mere

prediction of the likely outcome of Mr. Matney pursuing his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas,
the evidence demonstrates that counsel actually went much further, unequivocally asserting that
withdrawal of a guilty plea is not legally permissible.

Such advice constituted a blatant

misrepresentation of Idaho law by counsel. See I.C.R. 33(c) (explicitly allowing guilty pleas to
be withdrawn prior to sentencing). Surely, such a misstatement of the law at least raises a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Cf. Booth v.
State, 151 Idaho 612, 619 (2011) (holding that counsel’s performance is deficient when he
misstates an unambiguous sentencing statute while advising his client during the plea process).
Second, the court’s inference that “there appears to have been no ‘just reason’” for
Mr. Matney to withdraw his guilty pleas (R., p.156) is unsupportable. The court took judicial
notice of Mr. Matney’s pro se motion to withdraw his pleas (see R., p.156 & n.2), and that
motion alleged that when Mr. Matney spoke to Mr. Smethers, and later when he filled out the
court’s guilty plea questionnaire, he was under the impression that he was only going to be
pleading guilty to felony DUI, not a persistent violator enhancement. (Augmentation, p.1.)
Additionally, there is evidence that when Mr. Matney learned of the enhancement at his entry of
plea hearing, he did not have sufficient opportunity “to contemplate his options, weigh the
gravity of his situation or allow any opportunity for consultation with anyone in regard to his

10

serious predicament.” (R., p.8.) Indeed, the transcript of that hearing indicates Mr. Matney was
overwhelmed. During the entry of plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Okay. Did you ask your attorney to explain any of these
matters that are set forth in the guilty plea advisory form?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did your attorney explain them to your satisfaction?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I’m sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I didn’t hear your answer.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. You don’t need to apologize. I’m just trying to—
THE DEFENDANT: It’s just hard to think right now.
(R., p.89 (emphasis added).)

In other words, there is evidence supporting Mr. Matney’s

contention that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. And
while there were other things said at the entry of plea hearing that the State would undoubtedly
want to use as evidence to try to show that Mr. Matney did knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily enter his guilty pleas, that evidence only illustrates the conflicting nature of the
evidence and underscores the fact that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Mr. Matney’s pleas were validly entered. And if they were not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered, that fact would certainly have been a “just reason” for granting his motion to
withdraw his pleas. State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009) (“If a plea was not taken
in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, then ‘manifest injustice’ or the lower standard of ‘just
reason’ will be established as a matter of law.”). Thus, the district erred when it ruled, as a
matter of law at the summary dismissal stage, that there was no just reason for Mr. Matney to

11

withdraw his pleas and, therefore, counsel’s performance in mis-advising Mr. Matney about his
motion to withdraw his pleas could not have been deficient.
Third, the fact that Mr. Matney confirmed to the district that he wished to withdraw his
plea does not disprove the deficient performance of counsel; it simply shows that Mr. Matney
relied on the mistaken advice of his counsel. The State’s argument, adopted by the district court,
might hold sway under a wholly different set of facts—such as where the defendant expresses a
desire to withdraw a motion that is completely independent of the mis-advice of counsel. 10 But
that was not the case here. In this case, the uncontradicted evidence clearly demonstrates that
Mr. Matney consented to the withdrawal of the motion to withdraw his pleas based on counsel’s
mis-advice. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Smethers apparently first learned of Mr. Matney’s
motion, and was given a chance to review it and discuss it with his client. (R., p.75.) After that
discussion, Mr. Smethers moved to withdraw the motion. (R., p.75.) At that point, Mr. Matney
explicitly consented to withdrawal of the motion and proceeding with sentencing. (R., pp.7576.) Although the record is silent as Mr. Matney’s reasons for doing so, the only reasonable
inference was that he was relying on the advice given by Mr. Smethers during their brief off-therecord conversation.

(See R., pp.75-76.)

This inference is also supported by the sworn

statements of Mr. Matney in his verified petition, where he stated: “on February 4 th, 2014, at
Matney’s sentencing, Mr. Smethers took Matney aside and told him it was too late to withdraw
his Pleas and that withdrawal of a ‘Guilty’ Plea is absolutely not allowed.” (R., p.8.) Again, the
only reasonable inference is that Mr. Matney relied on this advice in consenting to the

10

Having said that, it seems more likely that a showing that the defendant independently sought
to withdraw a given motion would go to the prejudice prong of the analysis, not the deficient
performance prong. Defense counsel misstating clear law is unreasonable, but it might not
always impact the outcome of the case.
12

withdrawal of his motion in open court. And that inference was required to have been drawn
during the summary dismissal stage. Wheeler, 162 Idaho at 359.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court reviewed the State’s motion under the
wrong framework.

It evaluated whether Mr. Matney proved (“established”) deficient

performance, not whether there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning deficient
performance. At the outset of its discussion of Claim 9(k), the court identified the question at
hand as “determin[ing] whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to
withdraw Petitioner’s guilty plea before sentencing.” (R., p.154.) It went on to discuss the
standard for proving ineffective assistance where the claim is that counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a certain motion. (R., p.155.) It then ruled that, “Petitioner has not established
either prong of the Strickland standard as to” Claim 9(k) (R., p.156 (emphasis added)), and
proceeded to explain why it believed deficient performance, in particular, was not “established”
(R., pp.156-57).

However, Mr. Matney had no obligation to prove deficient performance to

survive summary dismissal; his only obligation was to present evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(c). Because the district court applied the wrong
standard, the summary dismissal order should be vacated, and the case remanded to the district
court for further proceedings.

2.

Prejudice

After addressing the deficient performance question, the district court moved on to a brief
analysis of the second prong of the Strickland analysis—prejudice. (R., p.157.) It ruled that
Mr. Matney failed to “establish” the prejudice prong “because a motion to withdraw the guilty
plea would most likely have been denied.” (R., p.157.) There are at least two fatal flaws in this
reasoning though.

First, the court again applied the wrong framework, analyzing whether

13

Mr. Matney proved prejudice. As noted in the preceding section (and incorporated herein), that
is not the standard for summary dismissal; the relevant analysis was whether there was a genuine
issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(c).
Second, the determination that a motion to withdraw Mr. Matney’s pleas “most likely”
would have been denied is not sufficient to conclude that counsel’s deficient performance was
not prejudicial. In order to establish prejudice under the Strickland standard, it need not be
shown “that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case”
since the “result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself
unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have
determined the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94 (emphasis added). Instead, it need
only be shown “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
Thus, here too, the district court applied the wrong standard.
In light of the foregoing errors, the summary dismissal order should be vacated, and the
case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Matney respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court’s judgment and its summary dismissal order, and that it remand this case to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Matney’s Claim 9(k).
DATED this 4th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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